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Abstract
In a recent paper (Synthese, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-
019-02101-3), Oldofredi presents a critical analysis of my mentalistic
formulation of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Here
I answer these criticisms, and explain more clearly why the formulation
is helpful to understand and solve the measurement problem.
The conventional formulation of the measurement problem of quantum
mechanics is given by Maudlin (1995), according to which the problem orig-
inates from the incompatibility of the following three claims:
(C1). the wave function of a physical system is a complete description
of the system;
(C2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(C3). a measurement yields a single definite result.
In a previous paper (Gao, 2019), I proposed a new formulation of the mea-
surement problem, which states the incompatibility of the following three
assumptions:
(A1). the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function;
(A2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(A3). a measurement by an observer yields a single mental state with a
definite record.
Recently Oldofredi (2019) presents a critical analysis of this mentalistic for-
mulation of the measurement problem. In this paper, I will answer his
criticisms, and explain more clearly why the new formulation is helpful to
understand and solve the measurement problem.
In order to evaluate the criticisms of Oldofredi, let us first compare the
two formulations of the measurement problem and see if the later is more
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appropriate with respect to the former. The key is to understand the claim
(C3) in Maudlin’s formulation of the measurement problem, namely “a mea-
surement yields a single definite result.” Where does this claim come from?
Is it really true? Here we only consider the one-world case, since both
(C3) and (A3) are not true in the many-worlds case. As Oldofredi (2019)
also admitted, the claim (C3) comes from the empirical evidence. He said,
“macroscopic objects can be in superposition, contradicting empirical evi-
dence, i.e. uniqueness and definiteness of measurement outcomes. This is in
essence of the famous measurement problem of quantum theory” (Oldofredi,
2019). Then, if the claim (C3) indeed comes from the empirical evidence,
then it actually means that an observer observes that a measuring device
yields a single definite result after a measurement. In other words, an ob-
servation or a measurement by an observer yields a single definite record,
such as a pointer being in a definite position, in her mental state.
In fact, what we know with certainty by experience is only that we as
observers obtain a definite record after a measurement by having a definite
mental state with the record. While we don’t know whether a measuring
device really obtains a definite result (e.g. the pointer of a device indicates
a definite position) after a measurement. For example, if the mental state is
determined randomly by one branch of the post-measurement superposition
as in the single-mind theory (Albert and Loewer, 1988), then the pointer of
a device does not indicate a definite position after a measurement, but an
observer will obtain a definite record after an observation of the position of
the pointer.
Therefore, what the claim (C3) in Maudlin’s formulation of the mea-
surement problem really means is (A3), namely that a measurement by an
observer yields a single definite record in her mental state. Moreover, the
three claims in Maudlin’s formulation of the measurement problem are not
necessarily incompatible (when the measurement is made by an observer).
When the three claims are compatible, the formulation is invalid; there is
no contradiction and thus no problem in this case. This strongly suggests
that a more appropriate formulation of the measurement problem based on
(A3) is needed. What is it, then?
Since (A3) concerns the mental state of an observer, we need an as-
sumption about the psychophysical connection (i.e. the connection between
the mental state and the wave function) in order to derive a contradiction.
This means that (C1), which says that the wave function of a physical sys-
tem is a complete description of the system, should be replaced by another
assumption about the psychophysical connection. It can be seen that this
assumption may be (A1), namely that the mental state of an observer su-
pervenes on her wave function. In fact, (C1) implies (A1) by the principle
of psychophysical supervenience.
Thus we will obtain the mentalistic formulation of the measurement
problem as given above (see also Gao, 2017, 2019). This new formulation of
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the measurement problem is valid in the sense that the three assumptions
in the formulation are always incompatible, and thus it is more appropriate
than Maudlin’s original formulation of the problem.
The question now is: can we have a physical formulation of the measure-
ment problem that does not refer to the mental state? It seems that the
answer is negative. The essential reason is that we don’t know what physical
state a mental state corresponds to in quantum mechanics. When removing
the reference to the mental state, (A1) can be replaced by (C1) or another
assumption such as that wave functions represent measurement results (and
other things in the world that can be perceived by us). But (A3) cannot
be replaced by another assumption that refers only to the physical state,
such as “a measurement by a device yields a single definite result”, since
we don’t know what physical state a definite mental state corresponds to.
As noted before, although we see the pointer of a device being in a definite
position, this does not necessarily imply that the pointer of the device is in a
definite position as a matter of fact. Thus we cannot derive a contradiction
between quantum mechanics and experience when removing the reference to
experience or the mental state. In other words, there is no physical formula-
tion of the measurement problem. In this sense, the measurement problem
of quantum mechanics is essentially the determinate-experience problem in-
deed (Barrett, 1999).
It should be pointed out that the above conclusion is true only in a strict
sense. We may also have a physical formulation of the measurement problem
in a restricted sense, namely when assuming what we see reflects what it
is truely (in the one-world case). In this case, when we see the pointer of
a device being in a definite position, the pointer of the device is indeed in
a definite position. Then, the mentalistic formulation of the measurement
problem may reduce to a physical formulation of the problem, which states
the incompatibility of the following three assumptions:
(B1). the wave function represents the measurement result;
(B2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(B3). a measurement by a device yields a single definite result.
The result assumption (B1) seems better than the completeness assumption
(C1) in Maudlin’s formulation, since in order to lead to a contradiction, the
wave function of a physical system is not necessarily a complete description
of the system, and it is only required that the post-measurement state of
the measuring device represents the measurement result.
The mentalistic formulation of the measurement problem highlights the
important role of psychophysical connection in causing the measurement
problem. By this new formulation, we can look at the solutions of the
problem from a new angle. In particular, Bohm’s theory, Everett’s theory
and collapse theories correspond to three different forms of psychophysical
connection (as well as three different result assumptions). In fact, there are
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only three types of physical states that may determine the mental state of
an observer, which are (1) the wave function in collapse theories, (2) certain
branches of the wave function in Everett’s theory, and (3) other hidden
variables such as particle configuration in Bohm’s theory.
Oldofredi (2019) gives a good introduction of how Bohm’s theory and
collapse theories solve the measurement problem. His line of reasoning seems
well accepted. A quantum theory such as Bohm’s theory is constructed as
follows. We first have an ontology and its dynamics that can explain def-
inite localization of macroscopic objects and definite measurement results
consistent with the Born rule. Then, as a result of the ontology and dy-
namics, the theory ensures that observers’ mental states will supervene on
well localized physical states and thus it can also explain the definite per-
ceptions of observers. Therefore, the measurement problem will be solved
by these theories without caring about the minds of observers. He said,
“Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories provide clear explanations of the
physical processes responsible for the definite localization of macroscopic
objects and, consequently, for well-defined perceptions of measurement out-
comes by conscious observers... these theories guarantee, in virtue of their
Primitive Ontology (PO) and dynamical laws, that observers’ mental states
will supervene on well localized physical states representing measurement
outcomes” (Oldofredi, 2019, italics added).
However, this common line of reasoning is problematic. Why assume
such ontology and dynamics in the first place? Obviously such assumptions
are made in order to account for our definite experience. Thus the actual
line of reasoning should be that these theories first assume implicitly that
observers’ mental states supervene on the well localized physical states rep-
resenting measurement outcomes, and then they assume certain ontology
and dynamics so that the measurement outcomes predicted by them can
be consistent with the Born rule. This means that in order to solve the
measurement problem, these theories still need to care about the minds of
observers by assuming a certain form of psychophysical connection.
Furthermore, as argued by Gao (2019), the form of psychophysical con-
nection in a theory cannot be simply posited, and it is restricted by our un-
derstanding of minds. For example, the form of psychophysical connection
assumed by Bohm’s theory is inconsistent with the popular functionalism
in the philosophy of mind when including the wave function in the ontology
of the theory (Brown and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2019).1 If functionalism
1Note that “Functionalism in one version or another remains the dominant view of mind
among philosopers” (McLaughlin et al, 2009, p.149). In particular, “virtually all current
major theories of mental content are in one way or another functionalist” (McLaughlin
et al, 2009, p.8). Moreover, in philosophy of mind, it is widely thought that although
qualitative properties of consciousness, or qualia, may be not reducible, other mental
phenomena are physically reducible, i.e., reducible to how physical matter moves and
interacts (see, e.g. Kim, 2005). Thus, if this kind of physicalism is true, then the form of
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is correct, for the mental state to supervene on the Bohmian particles but
not on the wave function, the Bohmian particles must have some functional
property that the wave function do not share. However, in a human brain,
where the wave functions are decohered due to the hot, wet and noisy en-
vironment and thus they are effective wave functions in Bohm’s theory, the
functional behaviour of the Bohmian particles is arguably identical to that
of the effective wave function in which they reside (when coarse-grained at
the level relevant to the mental functions of the brain).
Finally, even if the form of psychophysical connection assumed by a
theory is valid, there are still unsolved issues that are closely related to the
minds of observers. Take collapse theories as an example. In these theories,
the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function. Since
these theories can explain definite localization of macroscopic objects and
definite measurement results, and observers’ mental states also supervene on
these well localized physical states, it seems that they can readily explain
the definite perceptions of observers. However, due to the imperfectness
of wave-function collapse, the post-measurement state of an observer is an
entangled superposition of brain states with different records, although the
modulus squared of the amplitude of one state is close to one in general. This
leads to the well-known tails problem (Lewis, 1995; Albert and Loewer, 1996;
McQueen, 2015). Moreover, even though the tails problem can be solved, we
still need to analyze how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her
wave function in general. Since the collapse time of a single superposed state
is an essentially random variable, whose value can range between zero and
infinity, there always exist certain measurements with a tiny probability,
for which the collapse time is longer than the normal conscious time and
the observer after the measurements is in a general entangled superposition
of brain states with different records. Then, an intriguing question arises:
What is it like to be such a quantum observer?2 The answer to this question
may help solve the tails problem (Gao, 2019).
To sum up, I have explained why mind matters in quantum mechan-
ics, and in particular, why the mentalistic formulation of the measurement
problem is helpful to understand and solve the problem. I hope these ex-
planations may answer Oldofredi’s criticisms in a satisfactory way.
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